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ABSTRACT 
Although actor-network theory (ANT) is enjoying increasing interest in 
information systems research, we are still in the early stages of understanding 
and appreciating ANT’s potential for drawing lessons and developing guidance 
for industry practitioners.  This paper focuses on extending that practical 
understanding.  Here, ANT is applied in creating an account of a human-services 
firm’s experience in building its first major information system.  Several 
practical implications are drawn that point the way toward further adapting ANT 
thinking for applied use in system-project contexts.  Central among the insights 
are:  the potential value in viewing project leadership in terms of actor-network 
management; the need to treat network management more as a matter of 
facilitation than control; the importance of recognizing that the effective 
management of interests may have to begin with the very constitution of those 
interests; the need to understand how indirect representations of key interests 
during software construction may break down when the interests themselves are 
directly engaged during implementation; the need to manage the particulars of 
critical issues on which network stability depends; and the importance of 
grasping the interdependence between network stability and adaptability in 
design. 
INTRODUCTION 
Actor network theory (ANT) is 
enjoying increasing interest among 
information systems scholars.  This has been 
announced in conceptual works and reviews 
(e.g., Boland and Schultze 1996; Doolin and 
Lowe 2002; Hanseth, Aanestad, and Berg 
2004; Jones 1998; McMaster, Vidgen, and 
Wastell 1998; Monteiro 2000; Monteiro and 
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Hanseth 1996; Walsham1997).  It has also 
been witnessed in empirical papers applying 
aspects of this perspective to organizational 
initiatives (e.g., Aanestad and Hanseth 2000; 
Mahring, Holstrom, Keil, and Montealegre 
2004; Linderoth 2002; McGrath 2002; Vidgen 
and McMaster 1996; Walsham and Sahay 
1999; Whitley 1999; Wilson 2002) and at the 
industry, institutional sector, and societal 
levels (e.g., Bowker, Timmermans, and Star 
1996; Fomin, Keil, and Lyytinen 2003; 
Hanseth and Monteiro 1997; Marres 2004; 
Adams and Berg 2004; Allen 2004; Faraj, 
Kwon, and Watts 2004; Whitley and Pouloudi 
2001).   
ANT’s appeal within the field is 
unsurprising.  Its foregrounding of technology 
as a factor in the workings of human 
enterprises, its explicit attention to challenges 
posed by divergent interests, and its process-
oriented perspective provide a compelling 
framework for developing rich and convincing 
characterizations of information-technology 
implementation efforts.  Indeed, ANT can 
offer several advantages over alternative 
approaches to socio-technical analyses of IT – 
as the elaborated discussion in the following 
section will help to make clear.  
To briefly summarize, ANT, in the first 
place, compels a dynamic perspective on 
implementation phenomena.  In contrast to the 
static depictions afforded by variance-oriented 
styles of research (Markus and Robey 1988), 
which at their best uncover only statistical 
associations among the factors affecting 
implementation, ANT draws the researcher 
into direct investigation of the historical 
processes by which outcomes follow from pre-
existing conditions and the strategies of key 
agents acting under constraint.  Also, with its 
attention to competing interests ANT helps to 
bring political  issues to center stage, in 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper makes a contribution to both research and practice in the domain of 
information-systems implementation by showing one way in which research might be brought 
closer to practice.  The paper’s originality rests in its effort to use actor-network theory (ANT) to 
draw practical implications for the management of systems implementation. While actor-
network theory has lately commanded considerable attention in IS academic circles, relatively 
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difference between project success and failure; and that system evolution requires managing a 
paradoxical tension between stability in the actor network and flexibility in system design. 
This research is expected to be of considerable interest to researchers involved in field 
studies of systems development projects, and of general interest to researchers engaged in 
applying actor-network theory to various problems in the information-systems field.  It should 
also interest scholars concerned about finding ways to extract practical insights from 
theoretically grounded research.  While addressed primarily to academic researchers, this paper 
may also be of interest to IS managers and practitioners seeking fresh perspectives on the 
obdurate challenges involved both in getting effective user participation in systems development 
and in integrating new systems into the business processes and work systems of firms. 
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marked contrast to our community’s 
frequently genteel, conflict-neutral research on 
change.  ANT accordingly shares some 
advantages with stakeholder approaches;  
however, a key difference lies in ANT’s focal 
attention on the actions of technologies in 
working out the interplay of contending parties.   
In this regard, ANT undercuts one of 
three commonly unquestioned assumptions 
that underpin much of our community’s 
research:  the categorical dichotomy between 
human and non-human actors.  In particular, 
where an information system, as a non-human 
actor, is granted a place to act within 
heterogeneous networks according to the 
interests inscribed within it, a clearer account 
of both the technology’s design and the 
technology’s effects can be gained.  Thus, 
while ANT is akin to other constructivist 
approaches (broadly speaking), an ANT 
analysis can more readily get beyond 
regarding IT as mere “structure” that enables 
and constrains.  (For a comparison of ANT 
and structuration theory in this vein, see 
Hanseth, Aanestad, and Berg 2004.)  This 
points to a second assumption common to 
implementation research that ANT helps undo:  
The stepwise partitioning of technology design 
from technology use (Hanseth, Aanestad, and 
Berg 2004).  In this regard, ANT transcends 
such congenial perspectives as adaptive 
structuration theory (e.g., DeSanctis and Poole 
1994) in leading the researcher to consider not 
just variations in user appropriation, but the 
impact of use via feedback on the very heart of 
technical design (Ramiller 2004).  Finally, a 
third assumption which ANT exposes is the 
one associated with the use of a priori 
sociological levels (e.g., individual, group, 
organization).  In its place, ANT focuses on 
the identification of networks of actors, where 
the networks themselves are seen to become 
actors, as the scope of analysis widens.  This 
affords a flexible framework that makes the 
“levels” in implementation research a matter 
for empirical discovery rather than stipulation, 
and that helps thereby to foster a greater 
realism in capturing the action that takes place.  
Notwithstanding the growing appeal of 
ANT in scholarly inquiry, aspects of ANT can 
readily strike some observers as highly 
esoteric.  Perhaps most foreign is ANT’s 
elevation of technology to the status of an 
actor on a par with intentional social actors.  
This has been an important point of debate 
among the anthropologists, sociologists, and 
historians in science and technology studies 
(STS), whose foundational work gave rise to 
ANT.  However, the idea of technology-as-
actor can also elicit discomfort and an 
impression of exoticism in our more applied 
field.  The associated vocabulary (inscription, 
interessement, black-boxing, and the like) 
seems further to widen the gap that must be 
bridged between an ANT analysis and what 
we might hope to cast as useful guidance for 
practicing professionals and managers. 
Nevertheless, given ANT’s advantages 
applied scholarship will benefit from efforts to 
get beyond this surface impression of ANT as 
abstruse and counter-intuitive.  In pursuit of 
that goal, this paper applies a selection of 
concepts from ANT in an analysis of a major 
systems project, and then uses the 
organization’s experience as the basis for 
drawing a number of practical implications 
that suggest ways to apply ANT thinking in 
other project contexts.  The goal here is to be 
helpful, without pretending to 
comprehensiveness.  The project at hand, 
being a “sample of one,” naturally provides the 
opportunity only for selective insights (March, 
Sproull, and Tamuz 1991).  Even so, the 
situation is a particularly rich and promising 
one for inferring certain practical implications.   
The organization in question is a not-
for-profit human-services firm characterized 
by a lagging position in IT investments and 
experience.  Although the firm is a 
technological laggard (Rogers 2003), the 
objective here is not to draw a categorical 
difference between lagging enterprises and the 
relatively advanced firms that are more 
commonly the subjects of study.  Rather, the 
intention is to exploit the firm’s relative 
immaturity for its potential to set in sharp 
relief certain issues of imminent practical 
concern that hold across a broad range of 
organizations.  Brought especially into focus is 
the centrality of learning in the creation and 
play of interests in the project’s evolving actor 
network.  The immature and emergent 
character of the interests engaged invites a re-
examination of what it really means to speak 
of “interests” in ANT work.  Also clearly 
highlighted, because of the prominence of the 
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firm’s regulative and normative institutional 
context (Scott 1995), is the importance of 
attending to scope and heterogeneity in the 
practical application of ANT to the analysis of 
interests.   
Our discussion continues by 
considering selected ideas from ANT that are 
useful in interpreting information-systems 
projects like to one to be examined here.  A 
discussion of the case study then follows.  
There we begin with some background on the 
organization in question.  The data-collection 
approach is next briefly considered.  ANT is 
then applied in providing an account of the 
developments in the case.  The paper 
concludes by considering a number of 
potential points of application, based on 
observations from the case.    
ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY AND THE 
IDEA OF TRANSLATION  
Actor-network theory (Walsham and 
Sahay 1999: 42): 
… examines the motivations and actions 
of actors who form elements, linked by 
associations, of heterogeneous networks 
of aligned interests.  A key feature of the 
theory is that actors (or actants as they 
are sometimes labeled) are taken to 
include both human beings and non-
human actors such as technological 
artifacts.  A major focus of the theory 
when applied in particular contexts is to 
try to trace and explain the process 
whereby relatively stable networks of 
aligned interests are created and 
maintained, or alternatively to examine 
why such networks fail to establish 
themselves.  Successful networks of 
aligned interests are created through the 
enrollment of a sufficient body of allies 
and the translation of their interests so 
that they are willing to participate in 
particular ways of thinking and acting 
that maintain the network. 
As this quotation suggests, the pivotal 
concepts of translation and enrolment (Callon 
and Latour 1981; Callon 1986) offer a crucial 
focus for organizing and interpreting data in IT 
projects such as the one investigated here.  To 
these we will add the idea of inscription, 
which is central to understanding how 
technological artifacts, like information 
systems, participate in actor networks.   
Translation describes the overall 
process by which a focal actor attempts to 
align the interests of other actors with a 
program or project which that focal actor is 
championing.  “Translation” suggests 
establishing a linguistic equivalency among 
interests.  And indeed translation has been 
defined as the “authority to speak… on behalf 
of another actor” (Callon and Latour 1981).  
Thus, “A translates B” means that A defines B 
(Callon 1991).  Translation also suggests 
movement, and some studies in actor-network 
theory have accordingly used spatial 
representations to represent the bringing-
together of interests around a project (e.g., see 
Callon 1987: 206).  This act of bringing-
together or making allies (see the quote above) 
is a matter, first, of defining the equivalency of 
interests and, second, of persuading the real 
participants to act in accordance with the roles 
into which they have been cast.  This need for 
persuasion means that rhetoric plays a key role 
in translation (Walsham and Sahay 1999: 42).   
The process of translation has further 
been characterized as advancing through four 
stages: problematisation, interessement, 
enrolment, and mobilisation (Callon 1986).  
Problematisation identifies and characterizes 
the project and links it to the problems of the 
other actors.  At the same time, it positions the 
principal actor as indispensable to the others.  
Interessement is the process undertaken by the 
principal actor to lock the other actors into the 
roles that have been defined for them.  If 
successful, this is said to produce enrolment.  
(We will speak about the “enrollment” 
(admission) of clients in the case study.  
Accordingly, to minimize ambiguity we will 
use “enrolment” (with one “l”) for the ANT 
concept.) 
Mobilisation, then, arises from the fact 
that enrolment is based on representation.  The 
outcome of enrolment is that selected 
individuals are induced to speak as 
representatives for a larger group; for example, 
a lead user might speak for the needs of other 
users in the organization, a selected portion of 
code might speak for the reliability of an entire 
application, and so on.  The challenge in 
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mobilizing an entire group is that those spoken 
for may “betray” their representatives, dissent 
from the program, and divert themselves away 
from the project toward a contrary course of 
action (or “anti-program”).  Of course, the 
representatives may themselves reverse 
positions and defect.  With significant 
dissidence, the network of heterogeneous 
interests will fail to stabilize.  Latour remarks 
(1991: 127): 
… a program’s capability to counter an 
anti-program obviously depends on how 
well an actor’s conception of others 
corresponds to their conceptions of 
themselves or of the said actor.  If this 
convergence is weak, the actor will 
populate his world with other beings; but 
these beings will behave in an 
unpredictable fashion, attaching or 
detaching themselves to the program from 
version to version.  If, on the other hand, 
this convergence is strong, the actor can 
begin to make predictions – or, in any 
case, to guarantee the consistent 
behaviour of the beings constituting his 
world.  
When the convergence Latour identifies 
is strong, the actor network is said to move 
toward a state of irreversibility (Callon 1991).  
The commitments made by enroled parties, in 
the form of  resources brought to their 
engagement on behalf of a project, can be said 
to become “black-boxed” (Klischewski 2002), 
in that they are taken to be reliable and can 
become the basis for enlisting further 
commitments.  Where technology design is an 
issue in, or even the focus of, the project, the 
design itself achieves irreversibility and taken-
for-grantedness by degrees, in consonance 
with the larger actor network.  
It is readily apparent how these 
concepts might be applied in creating an 
account of an information systems project.  
The analytical task would focus on identifying 
the efforts of certain focal actors to translate 
the diverse interests of other crucially 
positioned parties into alignment with the main 
thrust of the project’s goals, and the practical 
moves they undertake to lock in the necessary 
commitments.  However, this framing, while 
fine as far as it goes, is merely sociological 
rather than properly socio-technical.  An actor-
network account must also identify how the 
technology itself acts with interest and force in 
the project.  Of frequent concern in ANT 
analyses is how the technology may fail to 
‘cooperate,’ whether as a function of 
misunderstood physical properties or as the 
result of a fatal immaturity.  However, of 
greater import in many systems projects is the 
way in which the technology actually does 
‘perform,’ so that it reflects the specific 
interests inscribed in it by virtue of its design. 
Inscription, then, is another key idea for 
consideration when applying ANT to systems 
projects (Monteiro 2000).   
The particulars of an information 
system’s design necessarily, if implicitly, 
express a normative view of the future.  It 
reflects certain parties’ perceptions of how 
things ought to be.  As such, design is 
invariably partial to the interests of some 
actors and not others.  However, inscription is 
not merely a matter of one or another party’s 
interests being reflected in and served by the 
technology.  As an actant in the organizational 
setting, the system can in fact prescribe 
patterns of action for others.  An information 
system, by its very design, involves 
assumptions about the relationships that will 
hold between the technology as artifact and the 
people who will use it and whose work will be 
affected by it.  Thus, a “machine… tells or 
prescribes the roles that it… expects other 
elements in the network to play” (Klischewski 
2002: 312).  
Inscriptions may indeed constrain the 
behavior of other participants in the actor 
network.  However, the notion of dissidence 
suggests that inscriptions are not necessarily 
utterly dictatorial.  The technology’s users, in 
particular, may deviate from the system’s 
embedded prescriptions and adapt the system 
to their own practices and preferences.  More 
broadly, where innovative technologies or 
applications are involved, means-ends 
relationships may be difficult to fully 
anticipate, and so design choices may produce 
unintended consequences in use.  In this light, 
the failure of the technology to perform 
because of natural limitations or immaturity 
appears as a special case of the potential 
fragility of inscriptions.  In ANT terms, in 
defecting a technology reveals itself to be a 
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problematic ground for the inscription of 
interests.  
Actor network theory has given rise to 
a number of other concepts.  For our purposes, 
however, the core concepts of translation, 
enrolment, and inscription, combined with an 
appreciation for the potential for dissidence, 
will serve as an effective point of departure in 
analyzing the case.  We consider background 
information on the case next.   
RESEARCH METHODS  
The Field Study Site 
The organization, North Bay Services 
(a pseudonym), is a not-for-profit firm that 
provides an array of services for at-risk youth 
and the developmentally disabled, including 
counseling and psychiatric services, foster care, 
group homes, on-campus residential facilities, 
employment-placement support, and special 
education.  Its annual budget is approximately 
$25 million dollars.  The firm operates in a 
changing environment, in which competition 
for resources from similar firms is increasing 
and new demands for accountability are being 
imposed by external funding bodies and 
oversight agencies.  As a result, North Bay is 
simultaneously under pressure both to operate 
more efficiently and to provide documented 
scientific evidence for the effectiveness of its 
care and treatment programs.  Achieving both 
of these goals requires far better capabilities in 
information capture, tracking, and utilization 
than North Bay currently has in place.    
Although “laggard” is a relative term, 
the label nevertheless applies to North Bay by 
several obvious measures.  Prior to the project 
that is the subject of the current study, only a 
small percentage of the workforce, mainly 
administrative and management personnel, had 
used computers in their work.  Beyond desktop 
software for individual use, the only enterprise 
applications in place were email, a basic 
corporate financial package, human resources 
software, and a package for tracking fund-
raising efforts.  No system functionality 
existed in the core of the business, where the 
tracking of patients (‘clients’) and 
documentation of their treatment continued to 
be handled by poorly integrated, incomplete, 
and inaccurate paper-based processes.  Internal 
technical expertise was limited to a tiny staff 
dedicated to PC and LAN support.  Managers 
and clinical staff, by their own admission, 
were “dinosaurs” in terms of their 
understanding of information technology.  
Meanwhile, pressures to limit administrative 
expense had caused the firm to fall behind in 
its IT investments.  In a research interview, the 
CEO conceded that the current project was 
basically reactive to the pressures of the 
“reimbursement climate,” suggesting that the 
current project would likely not have 
proceeded, despite a variety of motivations, if 
North Bay were not under pressure from 
outside entities to satisfy increasingly 
demanding reporting requirements. 
The project was the organization’s third 
attempt to build a core information system.  
Two previous attempts had been abandoned, 
the second after some two years had passed 
and several hundred thousand dollars had been 
spent.  The new system was created using an 
agile development strategy (Cockburn 2002; 
Highsmith 2002), under the leadership of an 
independent consultant, with implementation 
directed by a small in-house project team, and 
most programming work done by an outside 
development firm.  Up through the period 
covered by the current study, two major 
releases had been implemented and put into 
active service, supporting referral, enrollment, 
and tracking for clients in the residential and 
day treatment programs, the management of 
associated clinical records, and documentation 
of special procedures.   
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection focused on 
conversations with the project leader, which 
continued throughout the project, and 
interviews with major participants, including 
the system owner (the senior vice-president in 
charge of the affected organizational units), 
her primary reports, in-house project team 
members, key users, and North Bay’s chief 
executive.  Detailed notes were taken during 
the interviews; as soon as possible after each 
interview, an extended write-up was developed 
based on the notes.  The interview 
conversations were supplemented by 
attendance at joint user-developer design 
sessions (these were tape-recorded), 
observation of training sessions and system 
demonstrations (recorded in notes), review of 
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project documents (use cases, screen mockups, 
screenflow diagrams, and the like), and study 
of written communications (mainly email 
messages).   
Analysis of the diverse textual data that 
resulted from these efforts proceeded on an 
interpretive basis (Walsham 1993, 1995).  
Multiple readings of the data were made, and 
memos (Miles and Huberman 1984) were 
developed during the process to capture the 
higher-order generalizations that emerged.  
This style of analysis entailed shifting in 
hermeneutic fashion between the general and 
the specific:  Grasping how the overall pattern 
presented by the case informed the 
interpretation of particular elements alternated 
with the consideration of how the elements 
dictated revisions to the image of the whole 
(Boland 1985).  Data analysis commenced 
while field activities were still underway, so 
that insights gained from analysis could inform 
the on-going data-collection efforts.   
Actor network theory was adopted 
early in the course of the study as a basic 
interpretive framework.  Hence, observation 
and analysis came to be structured around the 
identification of categories of actors, the 
associated interests engaged, crucial events 
and developments, and the actions taken by 
participants.  Of particular interest, relative to 
actions, were efforts to affect project direction 
and system design, and to shape others’ 
perceptions of the proper configuration, scope, 
and goals of the system.  Also, in light of the 
concept of inscriptions, pains were taken to 
identify ways in which system features 
appeared to put pressure on the expectations 
and conduct of human actors occupying 
various roles in the organizational setting. 
During the analysis, work was also 
undertaken to identify a developmental 
structure within which to create an account of 
the project’s history.  However, this involved 
neither an appeal to an a priori sequence of 
stages (e.g., the system development lifecycle), 
nor the grounded creation of a phase structure 
based on the facts of the case themselves.  In 
fact, this effort abstained altogether from 
delimiting discrete phases in the project 
timeline.  Instead, the developmental structure 
that came to be drawn was a more fluid and 
imprecise one based on the emergence, growth, 
and resolution of critical issues over the 
course of the project.  (This is consistent with 
what Holmstrom and Robey (forthcoming) 
have characterized as the “episodic character” 
of actor translations in IT projects.)   
What we will regard, here, as a critical 
issue is a situation or set of events that 
demands resolution in order for the project to 
advance.  As such, a critical issue sheds light 
on the interplay of interests and exposes, in 
one or more ways, the vulnerability and 
potential reversibility of the project’s network 
of support.  Getting past a critical issue 
invariably entails the translation of the 
interests of particular actors whose 
commitments are vital to its resolution.  
Multiple critical issues can overlap in time, 
and a critical issue might need to be addressed 
more than once.   
Defined in this way, a critical issue 
corresponds closely to the concept of the 
obligatory passage point in actor network 
theory.  To use a spatial metaphor, an 
obligatory passage point is a situation through 
which the heterogeneous actors involved in a 
project must be made to pass (Callon 1986).  
This means that the actors must be convinced 
that their interests are tied to the particular 
resolution advanced by a focal or principal 
actor (Callon 1986).  In the course of such a 
passage, accomplished through a cycle of 
problematisation, interessement, and 
enrolment, the focal actor is said to make 
itself/himself/herself indispensable to these 
other actors.  
At North Bay, while the project as a 
whole might itself be regarded as an 
overarching obligatory passage point, the quest 
for empirical concreteness calls our attention 
to constituent situations, or ‘localized’ 
obligatory passage points, that emerged during 
the course of the project.  This, then, is where 
the idea of critical issues comes in.    
The emerging system itself was a focal 
actor in regard to many of the critical issues, 
because of the manner in which it implicitly 
attributed particular interests and roles to the 
other actors.  This, once again, is the idea of 
inscription.  For example, certain design 
features relating to data collection entailed 
changes to the work processes and cognitive 
scripts of users; reporting capabilities carried 
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implications for the information-usage 
behavior of staff analysts and managers; and 
organizational restructuring and business-
process transformations induced by the new 
system posed changes in leadership 
responsibilities for managers.   
Of course, for a system under 
development these kinds of inscriptions are 
only emergently material.  Prior to its 
implementation, the form of North Bay’s 
nascent system required representation by 
other actors.  The project leader, in particular, 
spoke on behalf of the emerging system, 
identifying and engaging the critical issues that 
defined the system’s own sociotechnical 
requirements, and attempting to draw about 
the system, issue by issue, the necessary 
network support.  Thus, the representational 
labor of the project leader brought this human 
actor and the emerging system together as a 
kind of hybrid focal actor (Hanseth, Aanestad, 
and Berg 2004). 
The project leader, then, naturally 
became a focus of attention in data gathering 
and analysis.  Despite her status as an outside 
consultant, she was the central representative 
for the system, steadfastly speaking on its 
behalf and authoring many of the translations 
demanded by the project.  The executive 
system owner, by contrast, had a very distant 
relationship to the details of the project and 
essentially no involvement in design decisions, 
and she interacted relatively little with other 
project participants.  In this managerial 
vacuum, the project leader’s scope of activity 
evolved well beyond the nominal role of a 
technical consultant “putting in a system”; she 
increasingly became an organizational change 
agent whose efforts embraced a range of 
sociotechnical design initiatives.   
Although the project leader was a focal 
point in the study, in keeping with Latour’s 
counsel to “compare the different versions 
given by successive informants…” (Latour 
1991: 127), careful attention was also given to 
the problematisations posed by other 
participants.  These shed light on the practical 
status of the project leader’s efforts in  
translation.  This provided, in some instances, 
indications of potential dissidence that could 
threaten to undo the network the project leader 
was struggling to build, and successively to 
extend, on behalf of the emerging system.   
In summary, the strategy for telling the 
story of the North Bay project was based on 
using ANT to identify and interpret the 
emergent issues that had to be addressed in 
order to maintain and extend the actor network 
behind the new system.  It was a matter, then, 
of writing history based on successive 
translations and the resulting enrolments (and 
defections).  As noted, this approach does not 
produce a neatly segmented chronology:  
Issues extend unequally over time, and can 
appear and disappear only to reappear again.  
Nevertheless, the following account entails a 
temporal structure, in that it introduces the 
issues in the order in which they came to 
prominence during the history of the project. 
THE NORTH BAY PROJECT:  AN 
ACTOR-NETWORK ACCOUNT  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
factoring of the project’s history into critical 
issues.  The figure is intended mainly for 
orientation.  The onset of any given critical 
issue is difficult to pinpoint precisely, and its 
ultimate resolution usually cannot be 
established definitively.  Accordingly, while 
the figure establishes the relative position in 
time when each critical issue surfaced, and the 
lengths of the lines suggest durations, the 
reality defies precise representation. 
Dismantling a Legacy Network 
A suitable place to begin the story is 
with the arrival of the project leader.  In a 
fashion befitting the emergent causality 
entailed in ANT analyses (Holmstrom and 
Robey, forthcoming), the project leader did not 
start out as the project leader, at all.  Nor, in 
fact, was there a project to lead, at this point in 
time.  Rather, the consultant who would 
eventually become the project leader was hired 
by the senior vice-president, on the basis of a 
serendipitous connection, to spend two weeks 
evaluating the second system effort (recall 
North Bay’s history, described above), which 
was then still underway.  A great deal of 
money had been spent at this point, most of it 
going to a local contract development firm.  
The functionality installed had fallen well 
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short of expectations, users found the system 
difficult to use, and communication problems 
between the users and the contractor had 
reached the point where further progress 
seemed unlikely.  After a brief period of time 
during which the consultant and senior vice-
president explored possibilities for salvaging 
the existing project, it was decided to abandon 
it. 
ANT investigations of systems projects 
typically do not remark on the need to clear 
out actor networks associated with prior 
activities.  But everyday observation suggests 
that the persistence of old network elements 
can impede the initiation and conduct of a new 
project.  The challenge here is more than a 
matter of cancelling contracts, dealing with 
legal issues, reassigning internal staff, and the 
like.  It also involves changing people’s 
expectations and undoing their enrolments in 
the abandoned effort.  It can also mean dealing 
with a kind of legacy of dissidence:  Those 
whose enrolment in the earlier project was 
problematic may be predisposed, based on 
their negative experience, to resist enrolment 
in the new project on the basis of a cynical, 
“Here we go again.”   
North Bay’s failures in two earlier 
projects, and particularly the costly and 
frustrating experience in the second effort, 
would ensure that the challenge of dismantling 
the legacy network would persist as a critical 
issue for a considerable period of time.  
According to several informants, of greatest 
importance in helping participants break 
cognitively with past experience was the 
manner in which the in-house project team 
interacted with the users.  In following an agile 
development approach, which involved 
frequent and intensive communication around  
focused issues of work process and system 
design, the team offered a distinct contrast to 
the previous system-development regime.  In 
that earlier project, interaction was sequestered 
in occasional requirements meetings driven 
largely by the contractors; otherwise the 
development group had little on-site presence.   
The technology itself also played a role 
in putting distance between the new project 
and its predecessors.  As pieces of 
functionality began to be rolled out, the new 
system introduced itself to its future users 
through a significantly superior and friendlier 
interface design (thanks in great part to the 
design skill of the contract development firm).  
The technology, as actant, thereby won 
adherents among the reluctant well in advance 
of its large-scale implementation. 
Establishing the Project Framework 
A collection of basic decisions set the 
initial course for the new project, determining 
much about how it would be developed, who 
would play what roles in the development 
process, and what the scope of the new system 
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would be.  All three concerns would help to 
determine whose interests would be, and had 
to be, engaged.  This period of decision-
making should not be construed as a planning 
exercise; to the contrary, it clearly represented 
an extended improvisational exercise 
involving a succession of interdependent 
selections and exclusions concerning the basic 
“how,” “who,” and “what” of the project.   
The project’s How.  One basic issue 
had to do with choosing between a package 
solution and a custom-development strategy.  
The core problematization, in this case, came 
to focus on the ability of the available 
packages both to support the diverse services 
of the organization (rather broad for a firm of 
its type) and to deliver those services, over 
time, across a geographically dispersed 
organization involving multiple facilities.  
Given this geographic challenge, a Web-based 
solution came to be regarded as a requirement.  
Vertical package options were, one by one, 
evaluated and rejected, and the firm came to 
settle once again on a custom-development 
strategy.  Here, North Bay relied heavily on 
the opinion of the consultant.  It seems 
apparent that North Bay’s executives and 
board fell short of fully grasping the technical 
reasoning behind this position.  What they did 
understand, in the circumstances, was that the 
consultant would exit under a package 
scenario (she had made this clear), to be 
replaced by experts in implementing the 
package chosen.  Significant trust had already 
been established in the consultant, and 
management was uncomfortable proceeding 
further without her guidance.  Trust, 
accordingly, substituted to a substantial degree 
for management knowledge and judgment in 
the IT domain, and foreshadowed the 
emergence of the consultant as the focal actor 
in the situation. 
The decision to take an agile 
development approach, also an aspect of the 
project’s basic “how,” followed the choice of 
the custom-development path.  The consultant, 
in fact, first offered management a more 
structured vision of how the project should be 
conducted.  However, after a short time the 
users’ and managers’ lack of prior 
participation in systems projects, combined 
with their inexperience in using information 
technology, made it clear that a more 
evolutionary approach would be needed.  The 
development team improvised the use of visual 
use cases (a blend of screen mock-ups and use 
cases) to facilitate user participation in the 
early stages of system-component design; 
these were followed as quickly as possible by 
the introduction of working pieces of software, 
which selected users could work with and 
provide feedback on.  This design cycle was 
pursued relentlessly as more and more 
functionality was rolled out to the organization.  
In this manner, users were enlisted to work 
closely with the development team throughout 
the project.   
As noted, a Web-based architecture 
emerged as another founding premise in the 
project.  Microsoft’s .Net technology was 
chosen at the recommendation of the 
development firm (see below) as the basic 
platform for developing the new system.  In a 
system project, components of the enabling 
technology are themselves actants that must be 
enroled and made to behave as required.  Of 
course, because of immaturity, poor fit, or 
fundamental physical limitations they do not 
always do so, and this can threaten the stability 
of the project’s actor network.  Here, the 
bleeding-edge choice of.Net seemed to present 
a textbook case of risk.  Nevertheless, it 
proved unproblematic.  The organization could 
not be so sanguine about its own computing 
and network infrastructure.  For an extended 
period of time, it seemed uncertain that the 
network administrator (see below) would 
respond with a program of adequate upgrades 
to support the new system.  This issue lingered 
for nearly a year, until it was eventually 
resolved with the replacement of this 
individual.   
The project’s Who.  Once the 
consultant had shepherded the organization 
over its break with the previous project, and 
management had once again advanced down 
the path of custom development, the 
consultant outlined a preliminary project-team 
structure in which the senior vice-president 
would play the role of system owner, and the 
network administrator (this was before he was 
fired) would be the project manager.  The 
consultant would stay on as system/business 
analyst and help with requirements 
determination and system design.  A staff 
person with medical-records training and a 
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broad knowledge of the organization would 
join the project team as a kind of cross 
between lead user and analyst.  A startup firm, 
comprised of individuals who had worked for 
a package vendor in the industry, would do 
most of the programming.  Their development 
work would be supplemented by a new hire at 
North Bay, a recently graduated information-
systems major, whose main focus would be on 
database design and development. 
As was true for the bleeding-edge 
technology, the initial composition of this core 
project team appeared to pose high risk.  
Although the individuals in the outside 
development firm brought considerable 
experience to the table, the firm per se was 
brand new, and it was accordingly unclear 
what kind of process difficulties this might 
cause between the two firms.  The junior 
internal staff (the lead user/analyst and 
database programmer) had next to no project 
experience.  The network administrator had 
never managed a software project, and the 
senior executive had never sponsored such a 
project.  While this initial actor network could 
accordingly be expected to be highly fragile, 
only the network administrator failed to rise to 
the new role into which he had been cast.  
Falling far short in basic knowledge, 
organizational abilities, motivation, and 
communication skills, he was discharged from 
the project leader role in fairly short order.  
The consultant (reluctantly) took over as 
project manager at the behest of the executive 
sponsor.  This far from eliminated the risk at 
this “node” in the actor network:  The 
consultant, despite having many years of 
software-related experience in diverse roles 
and industries, had actually never managed a 
software project.   
Besides essential aptitudes and basic 
knowledge, what appeared to give this 
unlikely collection of actors the potential to 
cohere as a stable network core was a high 
level of communication and trust.  This 
permitted the actors to find an alignment of 
interests, where each party’s prospective 
gains – in employment, career enrichment, 
firm success, solutions to management 
problems, and so on – were effectively equated 
with the advancement of the project.  Of 
course, this translation of interests was not 
instantly realized.  Instead, it represented an 
emergent property, worked out and proven in 
the process of working together on the early 
tasks of the project.   
The new system’s prospective users, of 
course, also represented an important “who” in 
the project.  However, they are best viewed as 
bringing a separate set of critical issues to the 
project, ones coming to prominence once the 
work on requirements definition and system 
design began in earnest.  In this process, the 
precise “who” of relevance were discovered 
and enrolled as actors over a period of time, as 
the system’s functionality grew and its 
organizational scope of applicability became 
clearer.  We will visit the users, accordingly, 
in the next section.  
The how and the who, of course, were 
interdependent.  Much as the who depended on 
the how – note that the hiring of the outside 
firm depended on the choice of a custom 
development path – the how also depended on 
the who.  It was the project leader’s trust in the 
technical leadership at the outside firm, for 
example, that made the seemingly risky choice 
of .Net reasonable.  In some instances, the 
direction of causality remained unclear.  For 
instance, did the retention of the consultant 
depend on the decision to pursue custom 
development, or was custom development 
chosen in order to retain the consultant?  
The project’s What.  Relative to the 
issue of what, our interest at this point is in the 
broad scope of what the system would be 
designed to do.  The specific features and 
capabilities of the system were a matter to be 
worked out, in detail, in downstream project 
activities.  However, as part of the initial 
project framing there was the more basic 
question of what services within the firm the 
system should support. 
As work began in earnest, the executive 
sponsor announced her priorities to the project 
leader, and situated enrollment and tracking of 
clients at the center of the firm’s information 
management needs.  Of course, organizational 
needs, however well-reasoned, do not tell the 
entire tale:  It must be possible to extend the 
project’s actor network in ways required to 
support the associated software-development 
work.  In this case, even though the executive 
sponsor had specifically identified enrollment 
in the foster care unit as a high priority, the 
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evasiveness of that unit’s director made 
extending the project’s actor network into that 
area highly improbable.  In particular, her 
engagement and the participation of her 
subordinates would clearly be inadequate to 
produce a sound and useful design.  The 
project leader subsequently steered the 
development work, with the executive 
sponsor’s tacit consent, around the foster-care 
services unit.  (The unit remains, today, largely 
unsupported by the system.)  
Here, the what and the who clearly 
interacted.  The scope of the system, as laid 
out by management, appeared to dictate who 
had to be brought into the actor network.  But 
that scope proved, in practice, to be more 
negotiable than might otherwise have been 
envisioned.  The requirements of the actor 
network, and limitations in the organization’s 
ability to satisfy them, in the end affected the 
constitution of the system.  How the system 
would actually work, what it would actually do, 
and where it would actually serve took shape 
in response to how soft spots and obstacles in 
the existing fabric of the organization defined 
the possibilities (and impossibilities) for 
extending the project’s actor network. 
ANT analyses often treat the 
technology as an actor once it has been built 
(its inscriptions put into place) and 
implemented, and can then begin to affect 
materially the activities of the human actors.  
Now, in a systems project based on agile 
development that moment of material 
engagement comes sooner than in traditional 
“structured” projects, as working pieces of 
software begin to be put into the users’ hands 
at an early point.  However, it was clear in the 
current project that even as a concept, the new 
system became an entity invested with a 
measure of power.  Rather like a magnet 
beneath a piece of paper strewn with iron 
filings, the mere idea of the system generated a 
kind of socio-cognitive field, with the 
capability of compelling attention and 
diverting cognitive resources within the firm.  
The developing discourse about the system 
began to affect expectations and beliefs within 
the firm, even before the system itself had 
begun to exist as a material artifact (Ramiller 
2001).  The range within which the system, as 
such a discourse object, could make its effects 
felt, corresponded closely to the expanding 
actor network for the project.    
That network expanded outward from 
the core project team to take in larger portions 
of the organization, as users were brought in to 
engage in conversations with the core project 
team about the emerging material features of 
the system and their eventual use in the work 
processes of the firm.  The particular 
challenges involved in network construction 
changed in certain ways, as this new 
population was engaged.  This phenomenon is 
examined in our next section.    
Making Software, Making Users 
User engagement in requirements 
definition and system design – note that in 
agile development regimes, the on-going 
adaptation of the system based on users’ 
continual feedback makes it impossible to 
draw a clear distinction between the two – 
essentially began with the inclusion of the 
medical records professional as a business 
analyst in the core project team (see above).  
Her knowledge of the organization, its 
procedures, and the information requirements 
of outside agencies provided much of the basis 
for the earliest efforts in data, application, and 
interface design.  Nevertheless, the circle of 
engagement progressively expanded to include 
other prospective system users whose 
specialized knowledge was needed in the 
project.  Of particular importance, at this stage, 
were the administrative personnel, clinical 
staff, and unit supervisors involved in front-
line data capture where the enrollment, 
tracking, and treatment of the clients took 
place.  Selected individuals in these roles were 
enlisted to review and revise visual use cases 
and, subsequently, the working pieces of the 
system.   
In this manner, user engagement in 
system design took on a two-tier character, in 
which a lead user with a more general view of 
the organization was involved broadly in the 
effort and others were brought in to address 
selected issues.  Over time, the role of lead 
user shifted from the business analyst to an 
employee of long tenure in the organization 
who held the curiously inadequate title of 
“medical transcriptionist.”  While she did 
indeed transcribe doctors’ dictation for 
inclusion in client records, the original role 
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reflected in her title had placed her in a 
position where a variety of client-related 
documents routinely passed over her desk.  As 
a result, her actual work had long since 
informally (although never officially) 
expanded to encompass data-quality 
monitoring and enforcement.  She became a 
primary user of the new system, as sufficient 
system functionality came on line, and the 
project leader sought her out on a regular basis, 
as efforts continued to refine and extend the 
system’s functionality. 
This period in the project witnessed the 
first significant business-side commitments to 
the system – beyond, of course, the project 
approval and funding granted by the senior 
management and board.  Most significantly, 
business knowledge was now being committed 
in a sufficiently concrete way to begin shaping 
the design of the system.  On the other hand, 
the participants’ inexperience with information 
technology and information-systems projects 
proved problematic.  Many prospective users 
lacked the pertinent cognitive frames to 
support effective participation.     
ANT studies commonly treat interests 
as unproblematic in themselves, and 
straightaway ask how interests do or do not 
become aligned (Walsham and Sahay 1999), 
and how commitments do or do not get made 
(Klischewski 2002).  But North Bay, in its 
laggard status, brought into sharp relief the 
fact that sometimes a project must entertain 
the constitution of interests.  The task of 
translation depends upon a certain level of 
subject competence that may not yet exist, 
especially in circumstances where actors lack 
the knowledge even to understand why and 
how and when to enrol (or dissent). 
This possibility adds an important 
dimension to the concept of translation.  In 
order to get actors “to participate in particular 
ways of thinking and acting that maintain the 
network” (Walsham and Sahay 1999:42), their 
interests may need to be constituted through 
the very processes of translation by which 
their enrolment is sought.  Learning 
accordingly can be seen as an integral part of 
the process of actor engagement.  This, 
obviously, also expands our view of the 
responsibilities of the focal actor in the North 
Bay project, who had to create a minimum 
threshold of business-side capability for 
thinking about IT and information 
management in the firm.   
Part of the project leader’s challenge 
was getting user-participants to recognize the 
basic contestability of the system’s design, 
their own potential for influencing it, and the 
inherent limits in the technical team’s 
knowledge and authority.  The restricted 
participation afforded users in the previous 
system project made this challenge even more 
pronounced, because of the expectations that it 
helped to create.  In response, the project 
leader fostered user engagement through 
measures expressly crafted to give users a 
large voice in the design proceedings.  Design 
sessions focused on users’ own narratives 
concerning work, in the context of hands-on 
engagement with visual use cases and working 
software.  Problematisation, interessement, 
and enrolment were thereby accomplished, in 
a concrete way, by bringing relevant 
functional elements of the system directly and 
tangibly into the users’ work activities. 
Users were also encouraged to engage 
in creating representations of how the new 
system might affect, and be affected by, the 
larger organizational context.  Thus, their 
engagement was not simply a matter of 
reflecting on the new system’s features relative 
to immediate work tasks and business 
processes.  This led the users, in turn, to 
consider the potential implications of system 
features for other interests not directly engaged 
in the design process.  For example, 
participants reflected on the information 
demands of funding agencies, the requirements 
of outside review agencies (like the Joint 
Commission for the Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations, or JCAHO), and the 
needs of family interests.  They also 
commented on the requirements of other 
parties within the organization (e.g., “What Dr. 
X wants to see, at this point in the process, is 
Y.”).  In this manner, the participants learned 
to position themselves as representatives of 
interests that had no direct voice in the design 
process at the given point in time.  This 
effectively served to expand the actor network 
in a virtual sense, and to foreshadow lines of 
network extension during the system’s 
subsequent large-scale implementation.  
Neil Ramiller 
 64 
In summary, during this phase the 
project in effect created its own users, even as 
the system itself was being built.  Each of 
these “construction” efforts helped to provide 
the context for the other.  In a sense, however, 
all of this work was prelude.  Design would 
begin with a vengeance with the rollout of the 
system to the wider organization.  That brings 
us to the next critical issue in the project.     
Mobilization, and Extending the Design  
Analyzing implementation from an 
ANT perspective involves attention to shifts in 
the representational activities of the actors in 
the network.  Representation, as noted a 
moment ago, is a defining aspect of the period 
during which major specification and 
construction take place.  For example, users 
involved in requirements definition and 
interface design speak for the needs of other 
individuals within the firm, and for the 
interests of their units and, where relevant, 
their clients.  Executive sponsors and 
participating managers speak on behalf of 
employees and other managers, and for the 
organization, its larger goals, and its 
stakeholders’ interests.  The project leader 
speaks for the organizational fit and value of 
the future system.  Technical personnel speak 
for the capabilities and requirements of the 
infrastructure that will have to support the 
operation of the new system.  Components of 
the emerging system speak for the 
performance of what will, at some point, 
become the full production system.  Initial 
data-loads speak to the quality of the 
operational data that will eventually populate 
the database.   
While, narrowly speaking, the actor 
network comprises the actants that are actually 
engaged in and making commitments to the 
project, there also exists a kind of virtual 
network that embraces a much larger 
population of actants spoken for but not (yet) 
speaking on their own behalf.  Figure 2 
illustrates this phenomenon for the North Bay 
project, based on statements made by 
participants in interviews, meetings, and 
written communiques.  (The figure does not 
attempt to address the substantial 
representational work that occurred where 
actors at North Bay spoke on behalf of other 
actors who were also within the boundaries of 
the actor network.  Were it to do so, the figure 
would show the project leader, in particular, at 
the center of a dense web of internal 
representations.) 
Again, as Latour also points out, 
although an actor “may populate his world 
with other beings,” it remains to be seen “how 
well [the] actor’s conception of others 
corresponds to their conceptions of 
themselves”;  the result may be that those 
whom the actor claims to represent may 
“behave in an unpredictable fashion, attaching 
or detaching themselves to the program from 
version to version” (Latour 1991: 127).  In a 
systems development project, it is at the point 
where large-scale implementation takes place 
that many elements in the realm of the spoken-
for now must be mobilized and moved from 
the virtual into the real actor network.  
Limitations inherent in the activity of 
representation mean that expanding the real 
actor network can be far from unproblematic; 
dissidence and defections, in fact, are likely.   
Figure 3 suggests the shift in scope of 
the actor network at North Bay, under the 
mobilization brought about by the large-scale 
rollout of the system.  A number of categories 
of actors that previously were without direct 
voice in the project now entered the actor 
network.  (For readability, the lines depicting 
representation that appear in Figure 2 have 
been removed.)  Mobilization does not imply 
that acts of representation now ceased.  To the 
contrary, representational activity expanded 
and increased in intensity in certain areas, 
especially where the growing complexity of 
interests directly engaged within the actor 
network fostered increased conflict.  
Nevertheless, as more actors began to speak 
for themselves through direct participation, the 
boundary beyond which representational work 
generated the world of virtual actors got 
pushed farther out. 
A key aspect of this representational 
shift is that the system became a more 
complete and far more pervasive actor.  While 
the earlier period focusing on software 
construction had involved a steady increase in 
user enrolments in the actor network, with full-
scale implementation the project witnessed a
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Figure 3. Mobilization in the Actor Network during Implementation
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discontinuous jump in the numbers and variety 
of organizational actors who directly 
encountered the system.  These included users 
not previously involved in the design effort, 
managers only nominally engaged before, and 
technical personnel with infrastructure 
responsibilities who would now be placed 
under significant new demands.  In short, the 
bringing of new actors within the sphere of the 
project’s actor network was to a substantial 
degree occasioned by the shift  of the system-
in-development to a production system. 
The consequences of such a significant 
expansion in a project’s actor network are 
complex and difficult to predict.  It is prudent, 
however, to anticipate significant dissidence, 
threats to the stability of the network and even, 
potentially, the rejection of the new system.  
At North Bay, a great many new enrolments 
had to be sought, which engaged the project 
leader and other system champions in 
extended efforts to convince other actors that 
their interests were in alignment with the 
inscriptions entailed in the new system.   
This convincing expanded the 
organization’s learning in two major ways.   
First, it entailed a collective effort to determine 
how roles and responsibilities ought to be 
changed in light of the new system.  These 
changes could not be planned in advance, but 
had to involve the organization in a process of 
discovery and sensemaking (Weick 1995) that 
could fully commence only upon direct 
engagement with the production system.  
Second, individuals and units within the 
organization had to develop the knowledge 
and skills demanded by their new or 
transformed roles.  
Clinical staff and administrative 
employees had to come to understand, and to 
accept, what the system expected them to do, 
especially in the area of data capture.  Analysts 
and managers, as information consumers, had 
to learn what the new reporting capabilities 
might entail for their work.  Managers, in their 
role as agents of control, had to grasp their 
responsibilities for restructuring and 
incentivizing changes in users’ behavior; they 
also had to learn how the new level of 
information generated by the system might 
affect the visibility of organizational practices 
to outside parties.  Members of the IT 
organization had to learn what demands the 
system and its users would place on the IT 
infrastructure and support services. 
While the new system thereby placed a 
variety of demands on the human actors, in 
such a situation the latter do not necessarily 
comply passively with the dictates of the 
system.  Even as their own work and conduct 
are under pressure to change, users and 
managers may in various ways act against the 
system.  This was clearly witnessed at North 
Bay in the early stages of implementation.  
Relative to data capture, for example, some 
administrative and clinical personnel balked at 
providing certain data stipulated by the 
system’s screens.  The consequences of this 
behavior for data quality posed an obvious 
threat to the system’s long-term viability, 
because of the potential loss of support for the 
system from other actors dependent on this 
data.  Beyond such passive resistance, users 
also acted directly against the system by 
proposing a variety of changes to its design, in 
an attempt to accomplish shifts in what data 
would be captured, when it would be captured, 
and by whom.   
In the discussion to follow, we will take 
a closer look at the mobilization of three main 
interests in North Bay’s implementation 
effort – the clinical and administrative staff, 
the managers, and the technical support unit.  
In keeping with an ANT perspective, we 
consider both how the new system impacted 
the expanding network of human actors, and 
how the human actors responded with their 
own moves to reshape the technology.  
Mobilizing the users.  In the early 
months of regular system use, a number of 
data-quality problems began to appear.   In 
some cases, clinical and administrative staff 
were not entering data the system was 
designed to capture.  In other cases, erroneous 
data were being submitted.  Some records 
were not being “closed” as required by formal 
procedures.  Other records were not being 
properly “signed off” by supervisors.  While 
insufficient training in system-related work 
processes could be faulted for some of the 
trouble, it was apparent that the issue ran 
deeper than this.  Users were in many cases 
balking at entering the data the system was 
designed to expect.   
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For example, administrative personnel 
doing enrollment processing (client intake) 
were found to be systematically leaving certain 
data-entry fields blank.  This gap was 
discovered by the staff analyst in charge of 
performance quality assessment, who required 
the information for certain reports he needed 
to produce for outside agencies.  A process of 
negotiation ensued, adjudicated by the project 
leader, in which issues of responsibilities, 
work-process change, and system design all 
entered into the mix.  The staff analyst lobbied 
heavily for making the fields in question 
required – in effect, a call for building new 
inscriptions into the technology that would 
dictate the behavior of the intake personnel.  
The intake personnel counter-argued that the 
information needed was not available at the 
point in time when enrollment took place.  
Analysis of the work process revealed that this 
claim was partially factual – timing was 
indeed an issue for certain pieces of data.  On 
the other hand, the intake staff could obtain 
some of the needed information with extra 
effort.  The resolution, then, turned on getting 
accommodations out of the intake personnel, 
combined with a restructuring of the work 
process and associated screen re-designs.  It 
also entailed changing the staff analyst’s 
expectations about when he could expect to 
get the information he needed.   
Problems also surfaced among the 
clinical staff.  One crucial area of system 
functionality was the recording of “special 
procedures,” physical measures taken to 
intervene with clients whose behavior posed 
an immediate threat of harm to themselves or 
others.  As clinical staff engaged this feature 
of the system, a variety of difficulties appeared.  
Some records were only partially completed; 
others included questionable or erroneous 
classifications of client behaviors; in some 
cases, multiple records were created for the 
same incident; many records were not formally 
closed and forwarded to supervisory personnel 
for review and signoff; and supervisors were 
often giving records inadequate review.  Even 
more seriously, the data that were being 
captured by this system feature appeared to 
expose the excessive use of special procedures, 
at odds with organizational policies and 
external licensing standards.   
A great deal was at stake in this issue, 
because for firms like North Bay special 
procedures come in for particular scrutiny 
from outside agencies.  The gravity of the 
matter brought a variety of supervisory, 
managerial, and executive personnel into 
discussions of possible changes in staff 
training, work procedures, and system design.  
The issue became intensely rhetorical (Latour 
1987), as participants invoked a variety of 
other interests that had no direct voice in the 
current discourse (again, see Figure 2a).  Thus, 
the interests of clients, the clinical staff (whose 
own safety was an issue), and accreditation 
bodies came to be represented in the 
discussions.  Overlapping and conflicting 
objectives were also advanced as having a 
legitimate bearing on the system’s inscriptions, 
including social control, regulatory 
compliance, adherence to professional 
standards, and retention of staff.  Although a 
redesign of the data-capture screens for special 
procedures was settled on, it remained 
doubtful (at the time fieldwork concluded for 
the present study) that a definitive resolution 
had actually been reached.   
Other problems with information 
capture in the residential and treatment units 
spoke to a failure to enrol clinical staff in new 
and essential roles in information management.  
Clinical personnel were the only ones able to 
record certain data at the point where the data 
were generated – specifically, in their work 
with the clients.  However, occupational 
identity presented a significant barrier to 
getting these actors to see front-line data entry 
as aligned with their interests.  As a number of 
managers observed during interviews, staff in 
the units viewed client care as their primary 
professional responsibility.  By contrast, they 
saw the information-generation aspects of their 
work as secondary (if not completely 
expendable) and “clerical.” 
In summary, the mobilization of users 
for essential data-capture activities raised a 
series of challenges in sociotechnical design, 
demanding creative and adaptive efforts in 
restructuring work roles and procedures, 
enroling staff, and re-designing system 
features.  This process was continuing at the 
point where the fieldwork for this study 
concluded, and in some cases successful 
resolutions to the emerging problems were 
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even then not clearly in hand.  Particularly 
serious was the persistent ambivalence of staff 
toward the information-management duties the 
system implicitly enlisted them in.   
In interviews, managers equivocated on 
the question of getting their staff to take up 
these duties.  Some managers even suggested 
that, notwithstanding the organizational 
importance of the new system, the matter of 
professional identity presented an intractable 
barrier.  The managers’ own ambivalence on 
this matter, then, suggested that mobilizing 
management was also problematic.  We turn to 
this issue next. 
Mobilizing management.  As staff 
directly encountered the new system, it 
became increasingly clear that management 
too had to become more deeply engaged.  The 
system put managers under pressure to make 
their own kinds of commitments, especially in 
regard to how they would manage their 
subordinates’ behavior within the work 
processes being transformed by the new 
system.  Where managers invoked 
“professional identity” to excuse employees 
from attending properly to data-capture tasks, 
they tacitly validated user defections from the 
actor network.  The long-term implications 
were potentially grave:  A sufficient number of 
such defections could perpetuate a pattern of 
failure in information management that would 
eventually lead to an utter loss of confidence 
in the system.   
Mobilization threatened to founder on 
three pervasive characteristics of the 
management group at North Bay – its 
immaturity in IT matters, a predilection for 
disengagement from operational specifics, and 
an ambivalence toward the information the 
new system would provide.   
Relative to immaturity, North Bay’s 
managers shared with the staff a lack of 
experience in the development and use of 
information systems.  Learning was 
accordingly of the essence in mobilizing 
management.  Of particular import was 
management’s need to learn that the new 
system was not just the technology involved.  
To the contrary, the true “system” – the 
investment that would move the organization 
ahead in information management – comprised 
the technology in concert with appropriate 
organizational structures, work process 
designs, job definitions, employee knowledge, 
and incentive schemes.  In conjunction with 
recognizing the sociotechnical scope of the 
new “system,” management also needed to 
learn how to draw the logical implications for 
its own responsibilities in change leadership.  
These lessons, however, were difficult to learn.  
A common impulse was to put the onus for 
outcomes back on the technology.  
Emblematic of this naïvete was the statement 
of one manager:  “We have a half- million 
dollar system now.  Why can’t it do what I 
want?”   
Overcoming this immaturity in thinking 
about “systems” was hampered by a 
managerial predilection toward disengagement 
in operational details.  A vicious circle was 
thereby set in motion, where disengagement 
meant abdicating opportunities to gain 
knowledge about the new system, and lack of 
knowledge in turn further discouraged 
engagement.  A rather extreme form of 
delegation ensued, in which crucial knowledge 
about the complex interactions between the 
system and the organization pooled with 
individuals apart from the firm’s management.  
These included, notably, the project leader 
who (as a consultant) was expected to exit the 
firm in the not-too-distant future, plus her 
young team members, who would likely seek 
greener pastures based on their experience 
with the project.  Thus, even as business-side 
knowledge built up in the system’s actor 
network, it threatened just as quickly to leak 
away.  Crucial knowledge also pooled with the 
lead user (the mis-named “medical 
transcriptionist”), whose tenure was more 
stable than these other actors, but who neither 
had, nor particularly wanted, the ear of 
management.  
Compounding the problem of 
managerial disengagement was the fact that 
the prevalent culture of decision making at 
North Bay entailed a diffuse, consensus-based 
approach, in which the responsibility for 
implementing decisions and doing follow-up 
was often poorly specified.  This made it 
difficult to clearly establish the commitments 
of individual managers.  The resulting 
elusiveness in accountability made it relatively 
easy for managers to reverse prior 
commitments.   
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The endemic disengagement appeared 
to be exacerbated by ambivalence concerning 
the larger movement in the industry toward 
enhanced information management.  
Management simultaneously did and did not 
want some of the data the new system could 
potentially provide.  While organizational-
performance measurements – to the extent 
they are valid, an issue raised in interviews by 
the firm’s own clinically trained managers – 
might promise to support improved practice, 
they also threatened increased exposure.  As 
the comments of management informants 
suggested, poor organizational performance 
was not the only concern.  Negative outcome 
measurements might also foster doubts about 
the viability of the disciplinary practices in 
social work and human services on which the 
enterprise’s core legitimacy was founded.  
Were its clinical practitioners indeed 
scientifically-grounded professionals or 
something closer to prison wardens?   
When it came to the challenge of 
mobilizing managers at North Bay, then, 
immaturity, disengagement, and ambivalence 
made it difficult for the project leader and her 
core team to gauge managers’ interests, to 
predict their behavior, and to rely on their 
commitments.  Randomness and disorder in 
the project’s actor network accordingly 
increased as the project moved forward into 
large-scale implementation.  The behavior of 
the director who supervised the majority of the 
units affected by the early system releases 
typified the challenge.  In addition to an 
unwillingness to engage his subordinates on 
the issue of data-entry responsibilities, he 
made comments well into the project to the 
effect that North Bay “should have gone with a 
package.” 
Mobilizing technical support.  As 
Figure 2b (above) suggests, implementation 
also entailed bringing within the project’s 
actor network the IT infrastructure necessary 
to run the new system on a production basis in 
the firm.  This required new investments in 
server and network capacity, plus operating 
system upgrades.  It also meant mobilizing 
North Bay’s small technical support staff on 
behalf of the system.  As noted earlier, North 
Bay’s network administrator had started out as 
the project manager but had quickly failed at 
the job; his subsequent recalcitrant behavior 
then raised concerns about the proper 
preparation of the infrastructure.  Doubts over 
the network administrator’s enrolment were 
rendered moot, however, when the CEO 
decided to hire a CIO, on the independent 
recommendation of two outside consultants.   
While it seems likely that the move to 
hire a CIO was due in part to the boost the new 
system gave to the salience of information 
technology, the effect was fraught with irony 
for the project itself.  Although the new CIO 
fired the problematic network administrator, 
his own behavior soon raised fresh concerns.  
Inside of his first few days at the firm, the CIO 
began stating to people on the business side 
that he “would have done a package” instead.  
Meanwhile, to junior members of the core 
project team, then in the midst of training and 
other intensive user-support activities, he 
announced that “it was time to pull away from 
the users,” in order to get started on other 
activities he had in mind.  In short, the CIO 
made it clear that he did not view his own 
interests as aligned with those of the new 
system; in fact, he appeared eager to 
encourage others to defect from the project’s 
actor network.  A prickly relationship at once 
ensued between the CIO, on the one hand, and 
the project leader and the system’s executive 
sponsor, on the other.  The threat that the IT 
infrastructure would not be enlisted in support 
of the system accordingly persisted.  It also 
remained to be seen how the CIO might 
influence the CEO, or how he might affect the 
views of mid-level managers whose support 
was necessary to get compliance from the 
users. 
The situation was eventually resolved 
with the escalation of the conflict to the CEO.  
The CEO affirmed his enrolment in the actor 
network by separating the new CIO from any 
authority over the system project, while 
making infrastructural support for the system 
the CIO’s highest priority.  The translation of 
the CIO’s interests was more fully 
accomplished, some months later, when the 
tenure of the project leader ended (due to 
budget constraints), and accountability for the 
system was formally transferred to the CIO. 
Beyond the obvious importance of 
making the infrastructure and the people who 
build and support it allies in a systems project, 
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the tale of the new CIO also illustrates the 
hazards that random introductions potentially 
pose to an actor network.  A new actor who by 
virtue of formal position holds power and 
influence not only represents a potential point 
of dissidence, but may also inspire or actively 
foster the defection of others and, hence, 
destabilize the actor network .   
Postscript:  Re-designing as 
institutionalization.  In a project based on the 
classical systems development lifecycle, 
significant changes to the user interface, 
application logic, and database are resisted, on 
principle, during rollout and implementation.  
Of course, many such projects witness these 
kinds of changes anyway, because of the 
problems with fully specifying requirements 
before users actually have the system to work 
with (Highsmith 2002).  At North Bay, by 
contrast, the agile development strategy made 
on-going system design an integral part of the 
implementation activity.  As noted here, 
organizational members took advantage of this 
regime by proposing various changes to the 
system, in response to mobilization crises that 
exposed problems in sociotechnical adjustment 
between work practices and workers, on the 
one hand, and the system, on the other. 
Some of the proposed changes had the 
potential to diminish the system’s 
organizational role – producing, in effect, 
localized de-inscriptions that would reduce its 
power to determine other actors’ behavior.  
However, at another level the very activity 
surrounding these proposals was indicative of 
a solidification in the system’s actor network.  
Efforts to re-design elements of the system 
helped to earn it a taken-for-granted status 
among the human actors involved, because 
they amplified people’s engagement with the 
system and increased their level of 
commitment to it.  Re-design hence became a 
form of symbolic validation, and helped to 
institutionalize the system. 
Maintaining the system, maintaining the 
network 
The final critical issue (refer again to 
Figure 1) is an incipient one, in that it had 
become apparent only as the field study was 
being concluded.  Nevertheless, it provides a 
good place to wrap up our story of the North 
Bay project.  
The project leader departed North Bay 
at the end of 2003.  The departure would prove, 
in fact, to be a hiatus, and the project leader is 
(at the time of this writing) back at the firm on 
a part-time basis.  In her absence, various data 
quality issues continued to arise, signaling the 
need for on-going design refinements, 
detection and diagnosis of accumulating errors, 
and changes in work processes.  The firm’s 
difficulties in actually addressing these 
problems spoke to the continuing inattention 
of the managers to the larger information-
management challenges in the firm, as well as 
to problems in developing effective change-
management processes between the IT group 
and the business and clinical side of the 
organization.  
In short, the exit of the project leader 
from the actor network appeared to hamper 
further advancement in the system.  This 
points to the potential perturbation that critical 
departures, like  the random introductions 
noted above, can cause to a project’s network.  
More broadly, it calls attention to the fact that 
system maintenance depends on the parallel 
maintenance of a viable, heterogeneous actor 
network, much like the kind that is required in 
development and implementation.  At the 
conclusion of this study, it was not yet clear 
whether executives at North Bay, including the 
CEO and CIO, fully grasped the need to make 
the requisite investments in the actor network, 
including hires in key roles that would 
continue in championship of the system.  
Conflicting priorities, including potentially 
attractive and symbolically visible new system 
initiatives, combined with persistent notions 
that the original system was basically 
“finished,” raised doubts about whether 
adequate support would be forthcoming for the 
now-established system. 
DISCUSSION: ACTOR NETWORKS AND 
THE PRACTICE OF PROJECT 
LEADERSHIP 
The goal of this discussion section is to 
draw some implications from the North Bay 
study regarding the broader application of 
actor-network theory to the practical 
management of systems projects.  (On this 
theme, see also Atkinson 2000, Klischewski 
2002, and Underwood 2001.)  While 
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generalization is the objective, this is 
obviously not a matter of statistical 
generalization.  Actor-network analyses do not 
aspire to variance models based on predictor 
variables and decontextualized statements of 
the form “more X will produce more Y.”  
Rather, ANT necessarily entails a process-
oriented view (Markus and Robey 1988).  In 
that regard, it is important to acknowledge that 
we are dealing with a single case, and 
therefore broad claims concerning patterns of 
process are out of bounds.  The goal here is 
more modest.  Using ANT as a lens, we 
simply want to examine the case for insights 
into the kinds of things management should be 
alert for, in any complex project involving 
multiple interests and actors.   
Project Management as Network 
Management 
In ANT perspective, managing a 
system project is tantamount to managing the 
project’s actor network.  Only on the surface is 
building an information system the technical 
affair it is commonly taken to be.  Instead, 
creating a stable, heterogeneous actor network 
is integral to the overall undertaking.  This is 
true not only when it comes to supporting the 
construction of the technical artifact, but also 
in establishing the web of relationships that 
integrates the system into the business 
processes of the organization.   
A further lesson we can take from a 
network view of the project is the need to be 
alert to the proper scope of the actor network.  
Figure 2a (above) suggests the potential scale 
and complexity involved.   
Network Management as Facilitation 
What is also clear is the inherently 
political nature of actor-network management.  
Garnering the enrolment of, and commitments 
from, key actors should always be regarded as 
potentially problematic and a challenge to the 
project leader’s skills in rhetoric and 
negotiation.  The need for rhetoric and 
negotiation suggests, in turn, that actor-
network management is not principally about 
control, but instead is much more a matter of 
persuasion and facilitation.  (Underwood 
(2001) also makes this point.)  The project 
leader is not outside of the network, but is 
really just one more actor within it.  As such, 
she can influence developments only from a 
particular position within the network.  The 
possibilities for control are further limited by 
the emergent, path-dependent character of 
network evolution.  Predictability is low, and 
the project leader must rely more on 
sensemaking and improvisation than on 
forecasting and planning.   
Even so, to the degree the project leader 
is successful in getting herself centrally 
located within the actor network, rhetoric and 
negotiation can be powerful tools.  At North 
Bay, as one after another key actor became 
enroled, and one after another defector became 
marginalized, the project leader came to sum 
up her striking level of influence using the 
literary shorthand “lathe of heaven” – a 
reference to Ursula LeGuin’s The Lathe of 
Heaven (Le Guin 1971), in which the 
protagonist’s dreams change the physical 
reality that he awakens to.   
Translation and Learning 
The idea of “translating interests” is 
obviously central to actor-network theory, and 
any attempt to apply ANT in practice must 
focus on this activity.  Nevertheless, after 
looking at a technologically lagging enterprise 
like North Bay, it becomes apparent that there 
are situations where certain “interests” may 
hardly deserve the label.  Now, although a lack 
of organizational sophistication in IT will 
make the immaturity of interests more 
pronounced, this phenomenon is also likely to 
occur even in more experienced organizations.  
This implies that accomplishing translations 
may not merely be a matter of alignment (as 
the earlier quote from Walsham and Sahay 
suggests), but may also demand the fostering 
of sensemaking and learning (Fomin, Keil, and 
Lyytinen 2003).    
ANT analyses commonly assume 
interests to be relatively stable (Allen 2004).  
But in a systems project like the one at North 
Bay, actors discover and define their interests 
in a changing context of work that emerges 
hand-in-hand with the introduction of the 
system itself.  Thus, even as participants weigh 
in on issues of system design, they are 
themselves transformed, “redesigned” as 
organizational actors, as they learn about the 
possibilities of the technology, establish their 
own identities as system builders, and move 
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toward a view of themselves as users that must 
know certain things and work in certain ways 
in order to function in the changing 
environment shaped by the new system. 
Accordingly, the project leader is well-
served by viewing the project not just as an 
effort in system construction, nor simply as an 
undertaking in network building, but also as an 
occasion for organizational learning.  Learning 
on the part of key actors will prove 
indispensable to the project leader’s efforts in 
problematisation, interessement, and 
enrolment.  At North Bay, for example, the 
project became a vanguard effort to create a 
minimum threshold of business-side capability 
in thinking about information technology and 
information management in the firm.  In short, 
the project leader had to do more than just “put 
in a system.”  She also literally had to “change 
people’s minds” – to transform managers and 
users into the kinds of actors who could act 
knowledgeably and effectively in their 
engagement with IT.   
The Politics of Representation 
As the North Bay story makes clear, the 
indirect representation of interests outside the 
actor network was essential (again, see Figure 
2b).  Representation helped shape system 
design in ways that would affect actors yet to 
become part of the network.  In other cases, 
the interests represented would never become 
active participants in the system project per se 
(e.g., the clients, state funding agencies), but 
were crucial participants in other actor 
networks in which the system itself would 
eventually function as an actor. 
Of obvious concern to a project leader, 
then, is identifying how the actors 
participating within the actor network actively 
represent others’ interests, in addition to their 
own.  Questions to ask include: Who is 
speaking for whom, by what right do they 
claim to do so, and how effectively do they do 
it?  These are crucial issues, because the 
design of the system will be shaped in part 
according to the representations put forward 
by those who have a voice in the process.  The 
resulting inscriptions can have a potentially 
significant impact on other members of the 
organization.  At North Bay, for example, we 
witnessed the staff analyst speaking for the 
interests of outside agencies, as he tried to get 
redesigns to system screens that would change 
the work of the intake personnel.  
Understanding representation is also important 
because it can help the project leader to 
anticipate where the attempted mobilization of 
parties not previously engaged may come up 
against resistance because of mis-
representation.  This may influence crucial 
decisions about the scope of participation in 
requirements definition and system design, and 
the management of power and authority in the 
project.  It can also affect how the leader 
sequences and times her translation efforts, for 
example, bringing certain actors into the 
project earlier rather than later.   
As noted, the project leader is not, in 
Machiavellian fashion, above the actor 
network, but is instead an integral part of it.  
As such, she too is an agent of representation, 
and will commonly be an active one, at that.  
Being in this position demands more than a 
modest amount of self-reflectiveness.  Whose 
interests should she be representing, and how 
should these be served through system design?  
The answers are not always clearcut, and 
invariably involve political and ethical 
considerations.  They can also raise difficult 
internal conflicts between the project leader’s 
own interests and the varied interests of the 
other participants directly, and indirectly, 
involved. 
Managing by Critical Issues 
This paper’s presentation of the North 
Bay story has used the device of critical issues 
as the basis for its historical framework.  
Critical issues, of course, also constitute real 
matters with which the participants have to 
contend.  Managing a project’s critical issues 
requires the leader to recognize them for what 
they are and to deal effectively with their 
particulars. 
Critical issues, again, are situations that 
present challenges to the extension and 
stabilization of the project’s actor network, as 
things move forward in time.  These involve 
problems in accomplishing the stable 
enrolments of actants who emerge as essential 
over the course of the project.  Stabilization is 
always a matter of degree, and subject to 
reversal.  It follows a complex, path-dependent 
process that demands leadership that is alert to 
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crucial developments, and that is then 
persistent and creative in handling them.   
Creating and maintaining stability in 
the actor network also demands attention to 
the details, as they emerge.  Effective 
leadership, in this regard, is not a matter of 
getting all the right pieces arranged at the 
outset, and then sitting back and letting matters 
take their course.  As noted a moment ago, the 
inherent limits to prediction make this a matter 
instead for vigilant and mindful attention to 
the facts (and interests) as they evolve.  The 
circumstances also call for a realistic view of 
the scope of one’s own influence over events.   
Managing by critical issues also 
suggests that timing is central.  A critical issue 
will develop in its own good time.  The 
specific pattern of extension in the actor 
network must therefore be dictated by the 
evolving project itself and the issues it 
produces.  Critical issues provide the salience, 
motivation, and opportunities for learning that 
actors need in order to engage in the network.  
For the project leader, premature efforts to 
translate particular interests are likely to be at 
best a waste of attention and energy, and may 
produce negative effects, including the 
invoking or hardening of resistance.   
Managing the Paradox of “Stability” 
In applying ANT in the information 
systems context, an important distinction must 
be made between the stabilization of the 
project’s actor network and the stabilization, 
or “blackboxing,” of the system itself as a 
technological artifact.  The two things are not 
the same (Fomin, Keil, and Lyytinen 2003).  
While ANT studies often imply that there is a 
strong correlation between the two – and some 
studies perhaps even conflate them – in the 
system development context we face a 
seeming paradox.  Accomplishing stability in 
the actor network, in the form of appropriate 
enrolments and strong commitments, may 
actually be a prerequisite for successfully 
suspending stabilization in the design, so that 
the emerging system retains its plasticity and 
adaptability.  For example, at North Bay, the 
project leader worked doggedly on lining up 
allies faithful to the project and to the larger 
idea of the new system.  At the same time, she 
directed the project using a consciously agile 
methodology intended to forestall premature 
closure on the features and capabilities of the 
system.   
This paradox of stability, while perhaps 
more clearly manifested in a systems project 
conducted in the agile manner of North Bay’s, 
is likely to hold more generally.  As 
Holmstrom and Robey observe (forthcoming), 
practically speaking an information system is 
never really “black-boxed,” because the 
system must continually evolve to meet 
changing business needs.  Their concept of 
“negotiation loops,” then, expresses the idea 
that a system should be open to a succession of 
revisions without any necessary endpoint.  
This leads us to another apparent paradox, of 
which the project leader needs to be aware.  
The institutionalization of a system – getting it 
to a taken-for-granted status in the eyes of the 
organization’s members (Scott 1995) – may 
depend on a maintenance strategy that fosters 
the system’s flexibility and readiness for 
change.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered the 
possibilities for garnering practical insights 
from actor-network theory for the management 
of information systems projects.  Drawing on 
the particulars of an intensive field study, a 
number of observations have been made about 
how actor-network theory might be used not 
only to produce a scholarly account of a 
systems project, but also to help manage the 
developments taking place in the project.  
Although ANT has enjoyed growing interest 
among IT academics because of its potential 
for rich explanatory characterizations of the 
course of project events, to date the literature 
has offered relatively little in the way of 
specific ANT-based guidance for management.  
Accordingly, a primary contribution of this 
paper has been to identify a number of issues, 
cast around the central idea of actor-network 
management, that may warrant managerial 
attention in systems projects.   
Such issues include finding the right 
balance between a facilitative stance and a 
control-oriented one; the potential need to 
constitute interests, as well as to align them; 
the hazards and pitfalls of representational 
activity among project participants; the 
handling of critical issues and phase shifts that 
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present new challenges to the stability of the 
project’s actor network; and the need to 
manage the paradoxical tension between 
network stability and system flexibility.  Also 
of crucial practical importance for managers is 
the recognition that they, too, are part of the 
actor network; as such, their own enrolment 
and commitments demand serious self-
reflective scrutiny. 
The case study has also provided some 
more general insights, with relevance to both 
theory and practice.  One is that the 
construction of a project’s actor network does 
not necessarily start on virgin ground, but may 
require the dismantling or disabling of actor 
networks that already exist.  Also, the very 
design of the system itself will tend to respond 
to the opportunities and limitations which the 
existing fabric of the organization presents to 
the construction of the project’s actor network.  
In this regard, even the best efforts to plan 
such a project must give way, by degrees, to 
improvisation, as the project unfolds.  Yet 
another insight, not often explicitly considered 
in ANT analyses, is the need to attend closely 
to the effects on networks of actors’ entrances 
and exits.  
Although limited in generality by its 
“sample of one,” the analysis offered here 
nevertheless suggests some of the rich 
possibilities for using actor-network theory to 
advance the practice of information systems.  
Future research in this vein would seek to 
develop additional ANT-based stories for 
projects in other organizations and, on that 
basis, to refine and extend the guidance 
outlined here. 
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